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Abstract
The notion of predictability, central to the conventional meaning given to
projection, is de-emphasized, and that of analytical credibility stressed.  The
usefulness of a projection is to be judged by the extent to which it contributes to
decisions shaping the future.  The author explores the epistemological base for
this reconceptualization of the projection as an instrument of “creating” rather
than “discovering” the future.  To this end, he turns to the contemporary
developments in the philosophy of science.
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Résumé
La notion de prédictibilité, qui occupe une place centrale dans la théorie
classique des perspectives du future, est substituée par celle de crédibilité
analytique.  L’utilité d’une perspective depend davantage de la mesure dans
laquelle elle contribue à la prise des decisions susceptibles de modeler l’avenir.
L’auteur explore la vase épistémologique de la redefinition de la perspective en
tant qu’insturment de “creation” plutôt qu’instrument de”découverte”, de
l’avenir.  La philosophie de science contemporaine lui sert de matière de
réflexions.
Mots-Clés:  Population forecasting, predictability, analytical credibility
Introduction
To begin my paper
1, I chose a quote from the famous Italian writer, Umberto
Eco (1989:199), who in turn borrowed it from Talmud:
“Whoever reflects on four things, it were better he had never been born: that
which is above, that which is below, that which is before, and that which is
after.”
The last part of the quote is particularly pertinent to my theme.  We will see that
any attempt to foretell the future is a gamble.  Yet, the future is as much an
existential part of ourselves as are the present and the past.  The question is
rather how the future is to be perceived or construed.
Though inquiry about future evolution of population has a long history,
forecasting as a utilitarian endeavour is of rather recent making.  It is only in the
past two or three decades that forecasting has evolved into a profession sui
generis, and a business on a respectable scale.
Population forecasting is now part and parcel of public administration and
private business.  The advent of electronic technology in data manipulation and
the blossoming of statistical modeling have no doubt been factors in its growth.
But a more pervasive inducement  to engage in forecasting has to do with
present-day bureaucracy, to use Galbraith’s term – committed to a management
practice which relies heavily on planning and quantitative evaluation of theReflection on Population Forecasting:
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anticipated impact of programmes and policies.  This “anticipatory
management” is very much part of the management culture of democratic
society and of a free market economy.
There are three ways of looking at population forecasting or, to use a more
neutral, less value loaded term, population projection, namely: fist as prediction,
second as simulation, and third as prospective analysis.  Let me review, one by
one, each of these three types of population projection.  Much of what I will b e
arguing holds true for projections in many other social fields; it is not unique to
demography.
Projection as Prediction
Let us remind ourselves first that the art of population conjecture grew out of a
deliberate effort to predict the evolution of population.  Indeed it was long
believed that the evolution of human society was governed by laws similar to
those found in the physical world and that it was incumbent upon scientists to
discover them and put them to practical use, including prediction of the future.
The following quotation from Marquis de Concorcet (1988:265), a major figure
of the eighteenth-century French Enlightenment, captures the mood of the time:
“If man is able to predict, with almost complete assurance,
those phenomena whose laws he understand, . . . he can, using
his experience of the past, predict the future with a high
degree of probability; when then should it be thought fanciful
to sketch with some degree of plausibility the destiny of the
human race, based on its history?”  (Translated from the 1988
French Edition)
From our present-day vantage point, Condorcet may sound overly optimistic, if
not far-fetched.  But the controversy between the proponents of social
determinism and those of indeterminism is far from settled (Gurvitch, 1963).
Some believe that social events are part of a kind of pre-ordained, “law-like”
process and are, as such, predictable.  Others believe in the historical uniqueness
and, hence, the inherent unpredictability of social events.
For the rationalization of demographic projection as prediction, one could turn
to three different theoretical frameworks. The first implies the existence of a
general law of population, and the second that of statistical regularities; the third
one involves a probabilistic or stochastic conceptualization of demographic
events.
In the way of a broad theoretical framework for forecasting population, two
well-known demographic theories come to mind:  logistic growth and
demographic transition.  Logistic growth theory describes an itinerary whereby,Anatole Romaniuc
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after initial growth difficulties, the population sets out on a course of rapid
expansion.  As higher levels of density are reached and growth is increasingly
frustrated in a finite space, population expansion tapers off to an eventual halt.
A mix of the Malthusian vision of exponential population growth and of the law
of diminishing returns, logistic growth theory is reflective of the relatively
simple relationship between population and the environment under the
conditions prevailing in pre-modern, agrarian societies.   Its appealing socio-
biological (or ecological rationalization (Quetelet, 1869) and elegant
mathematical formulation (Verhulst, 1844) made it influential among social
scientists of the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
centuries.  It gave rise to many empirical statistical applications – curve fitting to
observed trends in a variety of social fields, and forecasting.
Since the Second World War, however, logistic growth theory has been largely
upstaged by the demographic transition theory, its younger cousin which is
better tuned to the conditions of a modernizing society.  It postulates three stages
of evolution – from a high fertility/mortality equilibrium to a low
fertility/mortality equilibrium, punctuated by a stage known as “demographic
transition”.  The transitional period is characterized by rapid population growth,
as declines in mortality, induced by economic and medical progress, outpace the
declines in fertility that are slower to respond to such progress.  Rather than
“density”, the theory stresses “growth”, a more meaningful demographic
variable in the context of a dynamic technology-driven economy.  Furthermore,
it focuses directly on mortality and fertility and their determinants, rather than
on their end product – population size.
Yet, in spite of its greater theoretical depth and indisputable analytical
superiority, the demographic transition is no better than the logistic growth
theory for providing a reliable basis for forecasting.  Each historical experience
of demographic change is unique in more than one respect.  To be sure, one may
well expect, for example, fertility to decline in tropical Africa as that region
undergoes modernization.  But unless one can e more precise about the timing
and speed of the decline, generalizations such as those offered by the
demographic transition theory cannot serve as a modus operandi for making
population forecasts.  Or who can guess the future course of mortality now that
AIDS has reached epidemic proportions in some regions of Africa? All too
frequently, such unexpected events play havoc with what otherwise appear to be
predictable, long-term demographic trends.
Having failed in their bid to uncover a general law of demographic growth as a
basis for prediction, forecasters have turned for assistance to observed statistical
regularities of a mere limited scope.  Some denote simple associative
relationships; others imply cause/effect relationships; still others typify
structural stability, developmental inertia or a sequentiality of events.  For
example, fertility declines with an increase in female job opportunities andReflection on Population Forecasting:
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earnings outside the home.  Economic development brings higher literacy, lower
mortality and, ultimately, lower fertility.
Keyfitz (1982:747), a well known demographer, took a critical look at the
theories and statistical models embodying such relationships, with the aim of
discovering their utility to forecasters.  He concluded that though they may be
useful in explaining the past and, in some cases, formulating policies, they are
not very useful for forecasting.
“We have found few instances in which understanding of the
past and the conditional relation can be brought to bear on
forecasting.”
Observed relationships held constant or constrained to vary in certain fashion
may well be helpful in making “conditional projections”.  But what users are
after, Keyfitz points out, is dynamic, unconditional and not ceteris paribus types
of projections.  Conditional projections evade their real query of what actually
or probably will happen.  Yet it is doubtful that the past can provide any
guidance for the future.  There is no symmetry between explanation of the past
and prediction of the future, between retrodiction and prediction.
A renewed effort has been made in recent years to rekindle the predictability
concept through a probabilistic approach to projections.  One can cite as an
example Stoto’s (1983) attempt to construct confidence limits for future
projections from errors (differences between projected and actual population
parameters) in past projections.
“The discovery of stable error distributions allow us to transform the results of
the historical analysis into confidence intervals for future populations.  These
confidence intervals reflect the best efforts of competent demographers in the
past, and should be a reliable guide to the present generation’s ability to predict
the future.”
The theoretical foundation of a probabilistic approach to projections is not clear,
though one could think of two possible interpretations.  The first is to think of a
collection of projections analyzed for errors, as if it were a random sample
drawn from a much larger universe of projections.  An attempt such as Stoto’s
may be seen as being, in theory, of this kind.  In practice, however, it is more
like an extrapolation of past projection error – with all the pitfalls inherent in
any method which extrapolates past trends.
Another interpretation one could offer is that of predictions based on a
presumably valid population law (or statistical regularity) – subject, however, to
random errors and departures from the trend, to accidents or to deliberate human
interference.  For a remote analogy, one may look to the application of statistical
probabilities to certain laws in physics.  A case in point is Heisenberg’s principleAnatole Romaniuc
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of uncertainty, wherein an electron’s position and velocity at any instant can be
determined only with a certain probability.
With all the accumulation of knowledge on how demographic processes work
(or more precisely, have worked in the past) and with all the sophistication of
forecasting methods, we must concede to being no closer to getting a glimpse of
the future than we were before.  The future remains as opaque and elusive to the
forecaster’s eye as ever.  Unlike some natural processes, social processes are
evolutionary, non-repetitive, irreversible, and hence, unpredictable.  Nowhere
does Heraclitus’s aphorism – “you can’t step twice into the same river” – apply
better than to the ever-changing process of social life.  Moreover, in the modern
world, changes occur at ever greater speed, and they are increasingly triggered
by man’s deliberate intervention.  But while the social process is not pre-
ordained or law-like, neither is it chaotic and mindless.  It does not lack
coherence and order, and it is teleological in the sense of goal-triggered human
action.
Practitioners in the art of conjecture about the demographic future must lower
their sights.  Probability, let alone certainty, is out of their reach; plausibility is
the best that can be hoped for.  In most cases, however, projection is little more
than an exercise in future-oriented simulation.  It is to this subject that we now
turn.
Projection as Simulation
From their initial, narrowly focused heuristic uses – mainly teaching – forward-
directed demographic simulations have increasingly broadened their scope to
include policy applications.  They are now being used as analytical tools in
governmental decision-making  and in the evaluation of population-related
policies.
I should not dwell much on this type of projection because it does not raise
epistemological issues of the complexity that we encountered in discussing
projection as prediction.  Simulations are prediction-neutral.  No attempt
whatsoever is made to predict the future.  They are, by definition , “conditional”
projections, and tautological in the sense of one set of parameters (input) being
transformed into another set of parameters (output) that are relevant to the
problem at hand.  Demographic simulations present a large bag from which to
choose.  They vary widely with regard to their purpose and technical
complexity.
 A distinctions could be made between “process-oriented” simulations and
“goal-oriented” simulations.  In the first case, simulations are designed to
generate outcome in terms of, say, the population size and age structure implied
in an observed or assumed demographic process of fertility, mortality andReflection on Population Forecasting:
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migration.  They can be used to assess the implications of specific population
policies, such as Canada’s immigration policy on population size an age
structure or the implications of China’s one-child policy on population growth
and family structure.
In the second case, that of the goal-oriented simulations, a demographic “goal”
is set up on some grounds; then a simulation is performed to determine the
optimum combination of factors or paths leading to that goal.
Another distinction can be made between “single-purpose” and “multi-purpose”
simulation models.  Confined to a few demographic variables, single-purpose
models are relatively simple in their premises, as are the questions they address.
Their underlying hypotheses may be simpler, and validation easier.  Such
models are tailored to specific tasks and can be very useful as heuristic tools for
planners and researchers trying to elucidate specific population policy issues.
Multi-purpose models are another matter.  Large-scale and multidimensional
constructs, they invariably involve highly complex computer operations and call
for the input of many socio-economic and demographic factors.  They are often
designed to reveal the long-term implications of the interaction of these factors.
The case in point is the model built by Meadows (1974) and his associates at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology that simulates the future global
development of human society.
Some people expressed reservations as to how useful these complex
multipurpose simulations can e as planning and policy instruments.  To quote
Arthur and McNicoll (1975:151), “If there is one underlying source of weakness
in these models, it is their aspiring to be multi-purpose.  It is this that makes
them large, structurally inflexible, overdressed in side issues, and beyond proper
validation.”
Projection as Prospective Analysis
Prospective analysis is conceptually a more complex entity – neither prediction
nor simulation, within the meaning assigned to these terms above.  It embodies
some of the elements of the two, and certain other features. If one pictures the
transition from simulation to prediction on a continuum, with predictability
ideally increasing in degrees along that continuum, then prospective analysis
would be found somewhere midway along the axis. The hallmarks of this type
of projection are “potentially” rather than “inevitability”, and “plausibility”
rather than “certainty” or “probability”.
There are a certain number of requisites that a sound prospective analysis must
meet.  Let me go over them one by one.Anatole Romaniuc
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Analytical Credibility
The notion of analytical credibility is at the very heart of this conceptualization
of projections.  The argument underlying the projection assumptions must be
persuasive both to the developer’s professional peers and to users.  This calls fro
an analytical paradigm, designed in such a way as to assist in formulating
“credible” assumptions about the behaviour of the parameters to be entered into
the projection algorithm.
The particular configuration of the paradigm will depend on the state of the art
of demographic analysis in general and on the nature of the particular parameter
to be projected.  Some of its desirable common features can, however, be
singled out. While flexible enough to accommodate new data and
methodological advances, it must be capable of reapplication without major
alteration.  Reinventing the wheel for each new round of projections is wasteful
of time and resources.  Particular attention should be paid to the time series of
“leading” indicators in order to get some reading of the direction of the trends
and to detect any signals of possible reversals in the near future.  But not only
should the analysis rely heavily on those time series that may be regarded as
harbingers of tomorrow, it should, furthermore, bring into its purview relevant
policies and anticipated events deemed to influence demographic trends in the
years to come.  But, while doing all this, one should be conscious of cost and
timeliness requirements.  In other words, a projection model should possess
analytical capabilities and yet be cost-effective.  And this leads to the second
requisite of prospective analysis.
Minimizing the Input and Maximizing the Output
Indeed, while advocating the need to base projection assumptions on a sound
analysis, one should not lose sight of the fact that projection is not an academic
exercise but is, for all practical purposes, a business; costs and benefits matter.
The projection-maker must be cognizant of the up-front price tag accompanying
the analytical input to projections.  One must balance parsimony with efficiency,
quality with timeliness. On the one hand, the number of parameters to be
analyzed and manipulated (even in this age of powerful computers) must be
minimized so as to reduce the cost of the operation.  On the other hand, one
must select parameters that have analytical potential.  “Number crunching” does
not in itself guarantee sound analysis.  Hajnal’s (1955) advice, “less
computation and more cogitation”, should be a constant reminder to those
involved in making projections.  Parameters with intuitive value are preferable
to purely abstract mathematical parameters.  Not only do the former assist in the
understanding of the processes being analyzed but they also facilitate
communication between producers and consumers of projections.Reflection on Population Forecasting:
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The Frequency of Projections
1
While respecting certain periodicity, as a matter of policy, the revision of the
existing projections or development of new ones should be based on analytical
considerations, when, for example, the demographic situation has changed to
justify a new round of projections.
Single Versus Multiple Projections
Current practice, generally speaking, makes allowance for a range of
projections, based on alternative assumptions about future fertility, mortality,
and migration.  This in itself is reflective of intellectual reorientation away from
belief in a population law and acceptance of a more pragmatic intellectual
posture.
Time Horizon
2
Demographic changes do not occur overnight.  There is a certain inertia inherent
to demographic tendencies.  Projections over a period of 10 to 25 years is not an
unreasonable venture.  Anything beyond should be regarded as an exercise in
simulation.
The Usefulness of Projections
If we accept the fact that population cannot be predicted, then why make
projections?  What purpose does it serve?  The answer is that plausible
assumptions can be made about demographic tendencies, and those assumptions
may play a useful role in decision-making.  Plausible assumptions are all that
can be hoped for as a basis for “rational” decisions under conditions of
uncertainty.  This is not very different from what can be said about plans,
projections or expectations in making decisions.  More often than not, in real
life, these various anticipations exceed or fall short of the actual attainments and
have to be readjusted, in the course of time, to emerging conditions.  Yet they
have triggered new initiatives and actions.  They are indispensable aids in
managing the future.
In talking about the usefulness of projections, two points need to be emphasized.
One refers to the notion of “understanding” and its bearing on decision making.
“Understanding” the processes that lead into the future is important in preparing
for it; “understanding is the only appropriate method of dealing with the
uncertainty of the future conditions”, wrote Ludwig von Mises (1963).Anatole Romaniuc
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Therefore, throughout this paper, so much value is placed on the analytical
credibility of projections.
The other point refers to the way the future is conceived as being either
something that is to be discovered or something that is to be created.  This
distinction should be borne in mind when assessing the usefulness of
projections.  If gauged by the degree to which they predict population, the
results may indeed by deceptive.  But if the question is switched around by
asking to what extent they have been instrumental (irrespective of whether they
turn out to be right or wrong) in “creating” the future, judgment about their
usefulness may become much more positive.  A survey carried out among users
of projections may indeed reveal some startling figures about the amount of
money invested or traded, or about new schools and hospitals to be built as a
result of population projections.  Eventually, a welfare function may be
discerned – namely, that we are better off with projections.  Consequently,
looking at projections from the perspective of “creating” the future casts a
different light on their usefulness.  It gives them a different twist from the
conventional one emphasizing their predictive value.  With Peter Drucker
(1964), we shall ask “not what will tomorrow look like”, but instead “what we
have to tackle today to make tomorrow”.
The New Look at Forecasting:  Its Epistemological Foundation
Throughout this paper we have tried to clarify the meaning of projection in
terms of prediction, simulation and prospective analysis.  In doing this, I
signaled some significant departures both in substance and in accent from the
customary way of viewing the forecasting in the field of population, and by
extension more generally in social future studies.  Two distinctive features of the
reconceptualization of the population forecasting proposed here afford
restatement.
First and foremost, the notion of predictability, so central to the conventional
meaning of the forecasting or projection, is de-emphasized.  Instead, emphasis is
placed on the analytical credibility of the projection work.  This means turning
away from the far too elusive goal implied in the former, to one implying
improvability, and acceptability by the developers’ professional peers and by the
users of projections.  In practical terms, this means making use of all
professional skills available, within the confines of cost-effectiveness, to come
up with analytically credible assumptions about the key parameters of the
projection.  What is being implied in this epistemological approach to projection
is that we rid ourselves of the “oracle complex” and take a down-to-earth view
of what in real life is the kind of projections government and private agencies
engage in.  Their practical and applied nature needs to be stressed.  It is not a
vague speculative vision of the more or less remote future that we have in mind
when we sit down to develop projections but a set of numerical, time-boundedReflection on Population Forecasting:
 From Predictions to Prospective Analysis
45
estimates of the demographic parameters designed to be used by government
and private business in the decision making concerning the future, i.e., planning,
programme and policy elaboration.
The other significant innovation in the manner in which projections are
perceived, resides in the validation of their usefulness.  What counts in not so
much whether they turn out to be right or wrong, the extend to which they depart
from the actual population, something that can be verified only post facto.  What
is far more important is whether and how they are used in the decisions that
affect our future as individuals and as a collectivity.  Clearly, the acceptance of a
projection and the likelihood of its utilization depends a great deal on the quality
of the work and the professional credibility its makers enjoy among peers and
the users.  Projections thus acquire features of a working tool and take a
proactive stance rather than that of a passive contemplation of the future.  They
are turned into an instrument for creating rather than discovering the future.
This redefinition of the nature and the purpose of forecasting was partly
prompted upon us simply by the lessons we learned from experience.  We grew
more mature and wiser.  The repeated failure to “predict” the future population
led us to take a more pragmatic and sober stance in the matter of future studies.
B  ut there are more profound reasons for this change in forecasters’ moods.
They have to be looked for in an intellectual frame of mind, in Weltanschauung
fostered by the contemporary developments in science and philosophy of
science (see in particular Prigogine and Stengers, 1984).  The offshoot of these
developments is a frame of mind that pays due attention not only to necessity
(determinism), as the classical science did, but also to the chance and free will in
order to understand more adequately the complexity of natural and social
processes.
The classical, mechanical interpretation of the world, the cosmological world of
Newton with its timeless reversible laws, has seen its sphere of action, the scope
of its universality, significantly curtailed.  Modern advances in physical science
have given rise to a probabilistic, statistical description of physical world at its
micro, most elementary particles, and at macro-levels of natural laws, more
notably in chemistry and biology, that are irreversible.
The Plank’s quantum mechanics, the Heiseberg principle of indeterminacy, the
Second Law of thermodynamics, and entropy have revolutionized the
interpretation of the world and more clearly revealed the extent of its complexity
and diversity.  To quote Prigogine and Stengers (1984:8):  “We find ourselves in
a world in which reversibility and determinism apply only on limiting simple
cases, while irreversibility and random are the rules.”  Some processes are
deterministic and reversible, and repetitive; others are probabilistic and
irreversible, i.e., non-repetitive.Anatole Romaniuc
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But there is more than recasting the fundamental laws into a probabilistic,
statistical mode in natural sciences, and substituting the notion of order and
coherence for the earlier belief in immutable laws, in social sciences.  Chance
has made its entrée in the description of physical, biological, and social world.
Instability, accidents, disequilibrium, and chaos are very much part of today’s
scientific vocabulary.  Random and fortuitous events enter the descriptive
schema of the world as entities which have their own existence, and not just a
misnomer for our ignorance or, to paraphrase Poincaré (1947:65), those
occurrences whose laws we ignore.  After all, inverting Einstein’s well known
aphorism, God may play dices, and occasionally violate deliberately or
inadvertently His own rules.
In the field of population, the forecaster is often faced with the anticipation of
the reversals and turning points in what appears to be established trends.  Take
for example, the two probably most significant events on the landscape of the
contemporary demographic developments in the Western world – the Baby-
boom, and the Baby-bust. The Baby-boom, in particular, appears to be
completely at odds with the trends set up by the secular decline in fertility, even
though we may well be tempted to explain it retrospectively, as an outcome of a
unique historical setting of events – the Great Depression, World War II, and
postwar economic prosperity (Romaniuc, 1991).  As to the subsequent Baby-
bust, though from an evolutionary perspective its advent is explainable rather
nicely, it remains that it came as a total surprise to demographers.  Even more
puzzling is the out-break in recent years of AIDS as a significant factor in
mortality. Not unlike biology, demography may well experience its own
“random drifts”.  What in actual experience we have to contend with are
derailments some of which may be “caused” by external events, and others by
internal, sometimes very small imperceptible maladjustments, which however
may have large scale effects.  Whatever the source of these derailments may be,
their nature and mechanisms escape out intelligence so utterly that we have no
choice but to treat them for all intent and purpose as accidents.
The third and last element of our explanatory triad – the volition, the human
will.  The controversy between determinism and free will is as old as
philosophical thought, and its resolution is probably beyond the pale of science’s
reach.  As a basically metaphysical question, it may be ignored without serious
penalty for the discussion of the issue at hand.  It suffices to recognize here the
role humankind, individually and collectively, is playing or can play in shaping
its destiny.  This is done in a number of ways.  First through the discovery of
scientific laws, whether deterministically or statistically defined, and their
technological applications.  In this respect, humankind went as far as altering
nature itself and even its own making (the case in point being genetic
engineering).  Secondly, humans have demonstrated in the course of time their
capacity for social engineering.  And, if in some areas society was reluctant to
bring to bear this power, it was because of the actual or perceived high cost
(economic or social) or lack of political will.Reflection on Population Forecasting:
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Recognition of humankind’s ability on its own volition to affect social
developments has implications for forecasting.  It is often argued that
projections can be “self-fulfilling” or “self-defeating” prophecies, depending on
whether or not the anticipated outcome is viewed by the public, i.e., its political
leadership, as desirable.  To put it more generally, our actions may be prompted
by both past events and “knowledge” of the future, i.e., by present antecedents
and consequents.  By mere action of forecasting the future, we may actually
contribute to its creation.
The broader question, often raised, is whether statistical information, including
that contained in projections, can contribute in any discernable, meaningful way
to the resolution of public problems.  The answers to this question are often
tainted by the sense of helplessness in the face of bureaucratic inertia,
government’s shortsightedness and hard-pressed search for short-term solutions.
My own feeling is that statistical information has a role, sometimes directly, but
probably more often incrementally over time to the extent it contributes to
educating the public and decision makers about issues.  The policy effectiveness
of information, be it statistical or scientific, can be enhanced by closer
cooperation of various disciplines toward the resolution of problems of public
interest.  As Keyfitz (1993) so pointedly argued in a recent paper, the very least
the experts working on a problem from their respective disciplines could do, is
to  make the arguments underlying their assumptions transparent and thus avoid
sending contradictory messages to the public and to policy makers.  Democracy
is at its best when it deals with issues on which there is a high degree of public
consensus.
What is taking place in modern thought is the emergence of an intellectual
framework whereby the earlier antinomies between necessity, chance and will
are reduced, while at the same time they are recognized as factors in natural and
social processes.  Lesourne (1985:559) puts it succinctly:
“Chance, necessity, will:  these are three elements of creation and destruction, of
permanence and change, of adaptation and ossification.  Chance produces a
random sequel to the situation of a given moment; necessity involves one
variable determining another on the macro and micro level; will substitutes, for
passive elements, actors capable of formulating and pursuing strategies.”
(Translation from French)
In other words, social process is neither deterministic nor is it the outcome of
free will or sheer chance.  Rather, it is a combination of all of these.  The
modern thought brings the sciences and the humanities closer; it clearly
recognizes the importance of the “interaction of man and nature as well as of
man with man.”  (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984:7)Anatole Romaniuc
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This frame of mind has implications for the projection’s perception and design.
Were demography to obey only laws, what ever they may be, the scope of
projection’s maker would be primarily limited to developing and improving
mathematical functions of curve fitting and extrapolation into the future.  The
deliberate or spontaneous human intervention to modify the course of events
adds to the complexity, and the excitement, of the task.  It makes forecasters
broaden the scope of their analysis by including human volition.  Then, there are
accidents and chance.  Rather than disposing of them in the way of a cautionary
statement, “barring extraordinary events”, that often preface the presentation of
projections, they are recognized as inherent to processes of life, and force us into
the acceptance of uncertainty as a fundamental feature of the future.
Uncertainty about the future, as we explore its limits and potentials, can prompt
us into action and creativity.  With Erich Fromm (1947), we may say:
“Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his powers.”
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Endnotes:
1.    Delivered at the Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, on
November 25, 1993, in memory of Enid Charles.  For a portrait of the
personality and intellectual legacy of this distinguished pioneer of Canadian
demography, see Sylvia Wargon (1992).  This paper is a shorter version of
an earlier work, Projection as Prediction, Simulation and Prospective
Analysis, published in Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 29,
1990.  It contains, however, a section not published hitherto, in which the
epistemological base of forecasting is discussed.
2.   For a full exposition of the argument regarding this requisite and the next
two, refer to my article under Endnote 1.
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